Abstract. This paper gives a new example of exploiting the idea of using polynomials with restricted coefficients over finite fields and rings to construct reliable cryptosystems and identification schemes.
Overview
The recently discovered idea of using polynomials with restricted coefficients in cryptography has already found several cryptographic applications such as the NTRU cryptosystem [7] , the ENROOT cryptosystem [4] and the PASS identification scheme [6] ; see also [5] .
In contrast to the constructions of NTRU and PASS, which consider classes of polynomials of low degree with many "small" non-zero coefficients, ENROOT introduced a public key cryptosystem where the polynomials are of high degree, but extremely sparse. In this paper, we give a new application of this idea to the design of a fast and reliable identification scheme.
Let q be a prime power and let IF q be the finite field of q elements.
Given a set S ⊆ IF q , we say that a polynomial G(X) ∈ IF q [X] is an Spolynomial if every coefficient of G belongs to S, and we say that it is an essentially S-polynomial if G(X)−G(0) is an S-polynomial. (This notation is somewhat reminiscent of the idea of S-units in number theory, and is not related to constructions in algebraic geometry.) Finally, we say that a polynomial G(X) ∈ IF q [X] is τ -sparse if it has at most τ non-zero coefficients.
Throughout this paper log z denotes the binary logarithm of z.
The "hard" problem underlying our one-way functions can be stated as follows:
Given 2m arbitrary elements α 1 , . . . α m , γ 1 , . . . , γ m ∈ IF q and a set S ⊆ IF q of small cardinality, it is unfeasible to find a
. . , m, provided that q is of "medium" size relative to the choice of m ≥ 1 and τ ≥ 3.
More precisely, we expect that if one fixes the number of points m, the cardinality |S| and the sparsity τ ≥ 3, then the problem requires exponential time as q → ∞. Of course, we mean exponential time in the bit length of q, that is, in log q.
Indeed, consider the special case q = p, where p is a prime number. Let a ij ≡ α i j (mod p) and c j ≡ γ j (mod p) be chosen so that 0 ≤ a ij , c j ≤ p − 1 for i = 0, . . . , p − 1 and j = 1, . . . , m. In this (simplified!) case, the hard problem above is still equivalent to the hard problem of finding a feasible solution to the integer programming problem
where y j ∈ Z Z, x i ∈ S, and ε i ∈ {0, 1} for all i and j.
Basic Idea
Let us fix the finite field IF q and some integer parameters k ≥ 1 and r, s, t ≥ 2.
To create the signature Alice uses the following algorithm -which we denote SPIFI, for Secure Polynomial IdentiFIcation.
Initial Set-up
Step 1 Select at random k distinct elements a 0 , . . . a k−1 ∈ IF q and a random t-sparse {0, 1}-polynomial ϕ(X) ∈ IF q [X] of degree at most q − 1 and with ϕ(0) = 0.
Step 2
Compute A = −ϕ(a 0 ), and put f (X) = ϕ(X) + A. Thus f is a tsparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomial with f (a 0 ) = 0 and f (0) = A.
Step 3
Compute
Make the values of A, a 0 , . . . a k−1 and C 1 , . . . , C k−1 public.
To verify Alice's identity, Alice and Bob use the following procedure:
Step 1 Bob selects at random an s-sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomial
with h(0) = B and sends it to Alice.
Step 2
Alice selects at random an r-sparse {0, 1}-polynomial g(X) ∈ IF q [X] of degree at most q − 1 with g(0) = 1.
Step 3
Alice computes
and sends the polynomial F and D 1 , . . . , D k−1 to Bob.
Step 4
Bob computes
and verifies that F (X) is an rst-sparse {0, 1, A, B, AB}-polynomial with F (0) = AB, and
where
Of course, there is a negligible chance that the constructed polynomial F (X) is not a {0, 1, A, B, AB}-polynomial, however if rst is substantially smaller than q this chance is extremely small (and in this case Alice and Bob can always repeat the procedure).
The sparsity of the polynomials involved guarantees the computational efficiency of this scheme.
In particular, using repeated squaring one can compute any power a e with a ∈ IF q and an integer e, 0 ≤ e ≤ q − 1, in about 2 log q arithmetic operations in IF q in the worst case and about 1.5 log q arithmetic operations on average; see Section 1.3 of [1] , Section 4.3 of [2] , or Section 2.1 of [3] . Thus any τ -sparse
It is also well known that any element of IF q can be encoded by using about log q bits.
Finally, we remark that if 0 ∈ S ⊆ IF q then any τ -sparse S-polynomial G(X) ∈ IF q [X] of degree at most q − 1 can be encoded with about τ log(q|S| −q) bits. Indeed, we have to identify at most τ positions at which G has a non-zero coefficient. Encoding of each position requires about log q bits. For each such position, about log(|S| − 1) bits are then required to determine the corresponding element of S.
For example, the signature must encode rst positions of the polynomial F (corresponding to its non-zero coefficients), which takes about rst log q bits. Each position requires two additional bits to distinguish between the possible coefficients 1, A, B and AB. The encoding of D 1 , ..., D k−1 requires about (k − 1) log q bits. Thus, the total signature size is (rst + k − 1) log q + 2rst bits.
Putting everything together, after simple calculations we derive that, using the naive repeated squaring exponentiation,
• the initial set-up takes O(kt log q) arithmetic operations in IF q ;
• the private key size is about (t + 1) log q bits;
• the public key size is about 2k log q bits;
• signature generation, that is, computation of the polynomial F and elements D j , j = 0, . . . , k − 1, takes O(rst) arithmetic operations with integers in the range [0, 2q − 2] and O ((k − 1)r log q) arithmetic operations in IF q ; • the signature size is about (rst + k − 1) log q + 2rst bits;
• signature verification, that is, computation F (a j ) and the products C j D j E j , j = 0, . . . , k − 1, takes about O (ksrt log q) arithmetic operations in IF q .
We remark that the practical and asymptotic performance of this scheme can be improved if one uses more sophisticated algorithms to evaluate powers and sparse polynomials; see [1-3, 9, 11] . In particular, one can use precomputation of certain powers of the a j 's and several other clever tricks which we do not consider in this paper.
Possible Attacks
It is clear that recovering or faking the private key (that is, finding a t-sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomial polynomial f (X) ∈ IF q [X] with f (0) = A, and f (a j ) = C j , j = 0, . . . , k − 1, C 0 = 0) or faking the signature (that is, finding a rst-sparse {0, 1, A, B, AB}-polynomial F (X) ∈ IF q [X] with F (0) = AB, and F (a j ) = C j D j E j , j = 0, . . . , k − 1) represent the same problem (with slightly different parameters).
We also remark that that without the reduction
one of the one possible attacks would be via polynomial factorization. In particular, in a practical implementation of this scheme, one should make sure that both f and g have terms of degree greater than q/2 (so there are some reductions). Moreover, even without the reduction modulo X q − X, the factorization attack does not seem to be feasible because of the large degrees of the polynomials involved; all known factorization algorithms (as well as their important components such as irreducibility testing and the greatest common divisor algorithms) do not take advantage of sparsity or any special structure of the coefficients; see [2, 10] . In fact the first factor any of this algorithms will find will be the trivial one, that is, X − a 0 .
However the quotient F (X)/(X − a 0 ) is most likely neither sparse nor a {0, 1}-polynomial.
It is also possible that by using some "clever" choice of polynomials h, after several rounds of identification, Bob will be able to gain some information about f . Although the polynomials g are supposed to prevent him from doing this, in the next section we present another idea, which can be applied to other situations and which should make this attack completely unfeasible.
One might also consider lattice attacks. In the abstract, they could succeed, but since the dimension of the lattice would be equal to the (very large) degree of the polynomials involved, any such attack would be completely unfeasable. In particular, with current technology one can reduce lattices of degrees in the hundreds, while our lattices will have dimension roughly 2 31 .
Finally, the probability of success in a brute force attack to discover or fake the signature, when the attacker selects a random rst-sparse
Similarly, the probability of randomly guessing or faking the private key f is
In particular, we do not see any security flaws in this scheme even if k = 1. While the choice k = 1 has the obvious advantage of minimizing the signature size (in this case, Alice sends only the polynomial F ), in order to provide the required level of security, quite large values of q must be used. From a practical standpoint, it is very convenient to work in the field with p = 2 31 − 1 elements. Thus, to guarantee the 2 90 level of security, which is currently accepted as standard, it is better to take k ≥ 3. We believe that the choices q = p = 2 31 − 1, r = s = t = 5, and k = 3 provide a fast, short (about 4200 bits long), and reliable signature.
To prevent Bob from gaining any useful information about f by selecting some special polynomials h, Alice can select a ∈ IF q and two t-sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomials f 1 (X), f 2 (X) ∈ IF q [X] of degree at most q−1 which for some A, C 1 , . . . , C k−1 ∈ IF q and distinct a 0 , . . . , a k−1 ∈ IF q satisfy the conditions
and
where C 0 = 0.
To do so, Alice selects a certain parameter n < t, considers random {−1, 1}-polynomials ψ(X) and tries to find a root of this polynomial over IF q . For values of n of reasonable size this can be done quite efficiently, at least in probabilistic polynomial time; see [2, 10] .
It follows from Theorem 3 of [8] that for sufficiently large q the probability of a monic polynomial of degree n over IF q having k distinct roots in IF q is
In particular,
k ) Alice will find with high probability an nsparse {−1, 1}-polynomial ψ(X) ∈ IF q [X], having k distinct roots a 0 , . . . , a k−1 ∈ IF q . Then she can write Xψ(X) = ϕ 1 (X) − ϕ 2 (X) where ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 are {0, 1}-polynomials. Obviously, Thus f 1 and f 2 are t-sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomials which satisfy (1) and (2) . Therefore, now Alice can alternate f 1 and f 2 in a random order.
Instead of the sum ϕ(X)+ϕ i (X), i = 1, 2, one can also consider more complicated linear combinations with {0, 1}-polynomial coefficients. 
Concluding Remarks
It is natural to try to construct and use more than two t-sparse essentially {0, 1}-polynomials which take the same value at k distinct points. However our approach of Section 4 does not seem to extend to this case.
